Problems did not take long to arise. First came a raft of accusations that the seconded Egyptian staff were disseminating Nasserist ideas, replete with pan-Arabist, antiWestern rhetoric. These allegations appeared across the Arab world, but were particularly sharp-edged in the Libyan case. Not only was the monarchical regime essentially a British creation, and Libya home to an American air base, but Egyptians were also to be found throughout the Libyan state apparatus. Egyptians taught at primary and secondary schools across the country. The Libyan University, established in 1955, was initially staffed entirely by Egyptian professors. Egyptian professionals drafted the Libyan labor code, which was basically the Egyptian code with minor alterations. Hasan al-Maghribi, attorney general of Tripolitania, was a seconded Egyptian, as were two justices of Libya's Supreme Court. Seconded Egyptian bureaucrats were pressing the Libyan authorities to sack Brig. Gen. 'Abd al-Karim alNadimi, the Iraqi commander of the Libyan army, in favor of an Egyptian. There was evidence that many Egyptian teachers had in fact been "seconded from the Egyptian army." [2] By 1956, the New York Times wrote, Libya was home to "large contingents of Egyptian teachers, advisers and government administrators [whose] penetration into almost every field of Libyan life has become a matter of Western alarm. For these Egyptians are also helping carry on Premier Nasser's anti-Western campaign. There are almost 500 Egyptian teachers in Libyan secondary schools." [3] The teachers were arguably the most numerous of the early Egyptian migrants to Libya, and their political activity was closely watched by the regime. As one eyewitness put it in 1959:
The presence of Egyptian teachers explains why so many classrooms show the influence of Egyptian propaganda. Pupils do crayon drawings of Egyptian troops winning victories over Israel or Britain. In Benghazi, Libya, a complete course in Egyptian history is given to secondary school students. A display in a high school art exhibit showed pictures of the leading rules of Egypt; on one side were the "bad" rulers, on the other the "good" rulers. The bad rulers began with the Pharaoh Cheops, who enslaved his people to build the pyramids, and ended with Farouk. The good rulers began with the idealistic Pharaoh Ikhnaton and ended with, of course, Gamal Abdel Nasser. [4] Sir Alec Kirkbride, the British ambassador to Libya, reported in 1954:
The most damage to British interests is being done by the considerable number of Egyptian teachers who are employed in the Libyan schools. These people are in a position to poison the mind of the rising generation of Libyans against the Western powers in general and against Great Britain in particular. [5] Such reports alarmed the Libyan regime as well as its Western allies. British records describe how, in June 1965, King Idris arranged for secret police to be deployed to secondary schools across the country. Planted among the students, the spies soon reported back that the Egyptians were indeed teaching revolutionary ideas and spouting Nasserist propaganda. By early July, some 200 Egyptian teachers were deported, their contracts terminated. The plan, the king declared, was to end the contracts of all Egyptians and replace them with Libyan graduates who would have to teach "as a type of 'national service'" before they could obtain other government jobs.
The plan never came to fruition, for a few years later, in September 1969, King Idris was overthrown while undergoing medical treatment abroad. The newcomer Col.
Muammar Qaddafi, regarding Nasser as a role model and a great pan-Arab leader, at first pursued policy of reconciliation with Egypt. The resulting close cooperation between the two states allowed the Egyptian migrant community to thrive: Libya abolished entry visa requirements in 1971, allowing Egyptians into Libya with a mere identity card, and the two countries prepared a union with Syria in order to create the Federal Arab Republic. Egyptian workers, skilled and unskilled, flocked in their thousands to Libya, taking advantage of the fact that most Libyans continued to work in agriculture, rather than construction or services (see Table 2 ). Qaddafi was also delighted at the political aspect of the migration, believing that the free movement of labor constituted a necessary step toward "the unification of all Arabic-speaking people." [6] Egyptians in Libya During the Sadat Era, 1970-1981
The death of Nasser and subsequent rise of Anwar al-Sadat, however, contributed to the deterioration of bilateral relations and renewed turmoil for Egyptian migrants in Libya. Sadat, on the one hand, was convinced that Qaddafi was mentally ill --he did not hesitate to call the colonel a "lunatic." Partly to check Qaddafi, he drew closer to 
Mubarak and Egyptian Emigration to Libya, 1981-2011
Sporadic incidents occurred in the ensuing years, but no more mass deportations occurred --perhaps the economic embargo imposed upon Egypt by the rest of the Arab world in the aftermath of the Camp David accords deterred Qaddafi from further unilateral action. It was only in 1985 that the Libyan regime, facing severe economic problems given the slump in the price of oil, decided again to dispense with the "huge army" of "non-productive" foreigners. At least 20,000 Egyptians were deported over August and September of that year, with some estimates putting the number of deportees as high as 100,000 out of a community of 250,000. [9] The Egyptians were allowed to take only half their earnings, and were "stripped of their electrical appliances and often even household goods at the border." This mass expulsion followed a raft of measures against foreign laborers, including as pay cuts and cancellation of contracts. Egyptian and other Arab workers were allowed to remit only 300 dinars per person per year, as opposed to the 90 percent of total income they had been able to send home in 1975. In fact, foreign workers in Libya were not permitted to make any financial transfers at all during the first half of 1985.
Egyptian President Husni Mubarak challenged Qaddafi to admit that he had "exhausted his country's wealth on adventurism and terrorist acts which he [took] pride in supporting and financing everywhere." Libyan state radio, the Voice of the Great Arab Homeland, issued a sharp rejoinder: Egypt rejected the establishment of a united pan-Arab state. Its citizens, therefore, were foreigners, and the Libyan state was by no means responsible for finding them jobs. Qaddafi denounced as "monkeys" the Arab heads of state who had "sold themselves" to Washington. The deported Egyptian workers were complicit because they had refused to become Libyan citizens and transferred their savings out of Libya, thereby bolstering the Egyptian regime and the Camp David agreement. [10] The expulsion of Egyptian workers was, again, part of a Table 5 ). This process culminated in the December 4 signing of ten "integration" (takamul) bilateral agreements on economic matters. The warming of relations, however, was only temporary: By 1995, some 7,000 Egyptians were again expelled, this time in retaliation for the strengthening of Egyptian-Israeli relations. [11] For the remainder of Mubarak's rule, deportations continued intermittently, but on a small scale. Most deportees were Egyptian fishermen picked up in Libyan waters, who would be imprisoned for a few days, then released to Egypt, with the cycle often repeating. But the Egyptian community in Libya remained stable, due to some extent to Qaddafi's shift from Arab nationalism to pan-Africanism, whereby he dropped his pretension of speaking for the Arab world.
Egyptian Emigration After the Arab Uprisings
It was only in the aftermath of Qaddafi's ouster and Libya's descent into civil war that the situation of Egyptian migrants began to change dramatically. The Transitional National Council that nominally governed Libya from late 2011 through mid-2012 did little to intervene in the labor market. In early 2013, the General National Congress that had been elected the preceding summer began deporting Egyptian workers en masse on a variety of pretenses, including expired residency permits and fraudulent or improper documentation. The "visa crisis" escalated, as members of the Coptic community in Libya, in particular, were arrested on illegal immigration charges. On March 13 the Middle East News Agency reported the arrest of 50 Copts, guilty of illegal entry into Libya but also accused of proselytizing, as "they were found in possession of a quantity of Bibles, texts encouraging conversion to Christianity, and images of Christ and the late Pope Shenouda." Four Copts were jailed on the proselytizing charges, and one of them, 'Izzat 'Atallah, died in custody. As Egypt's assistant foreign minister denied that Egyptians faced any discrimination, news broke that over a hundred Egyptians, all of whom had reportedly paid 3,000 Egyptian pounds each to purchase employment visas, had been deported on a single day. By late March, the Libyan authorities were deporting over 400 workers daily. [12] Again, Egyptian workers were pawns in a chess match between the two states. "millions of Egyptians." [13] It is wishful thinking, for the Libyan economy barely functions and the Libyan state is in flux. Two separate quasi-governments, one based in Tripoli and the other in Tobruk, lay claim to the fragmented Libya of today, while the heavy presence of militias further impedes any political compromise. Nonetheless, in testament to the deepening economic hardship in Egypt itself, Egyptians continue to migrate to Libya in search of a better future. In doing so, they risk death, with little hope of protection from any state or set of powers that be. Indeed, in keeping with the 60-year pattern, the authorities in both countries are seeking to exploit the latest suffering of Egyptian workers in Libya for political gain. On the one hand, in response to the beheadings, Egypt launched a number of airstrikes upon Libyan territory that did little or nothing to safeguard Egyptian citizens and did more to demonstrate anti-terrorist bona fides to patrons in the Gulf and the West. The Libyan deputies in Tobruk, on the other hand, have begun to view Egypt's military involvement as an opportunity to deal a blow to their political rivals in Tripoli. They inveigh against the Islamic State to attract international support and conflate their opponents with terrorists. Egyptian workers in Libya are, as ever, caught in the middle.
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